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Sudden failure of a single transmission element in a power grid can induce a domino effect of
cascading failures, which can lead to the isolation of a large number of consumers or even to the
failure of the entire grid. Here we present results of the simulation of cascading failures in power
grids, using an alternating current (AC) model. We first apply this model to a regular square
grid topology. For a random placement of consumers and generators on the grid, the probability
to find more than a certain number of unsupplied consumers decays as a power law and obeys a
scaling law with respect to system size. Varying the transmitted power threshold above which a
transmission line fails does not seem to change the power law exponent q ≈ 1.6. Furthermore,
we study the influence of the placement of generators and consumers on the number of affected
consumers and demonstrate that large clusters of generators and consumers are especially vulnerable
to cascading failures. As a real-world topology we consider the German high-voltage transmission
grid. Applying the dynamic AC model and considering a random placement of consumers, we find
that the probability to disconnect more than a certain number of consumers depends strongly on
the threshold. For large thresholds the decay is clearly exponential, while for small ones the decay
is slow, indicating a power law decay.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Xt, 88.80.hh, 89.75.Da
A reliable supply of electric power is of fundamental
importance for the technical infrastructure of modern
societies. In fact, the reliability of electric power grids
has increased continuously in the last decades [1]. How-
ever, large-scale power outages still occur and can affect
millions of customers which may result in catastrophic
events. It is therefore important to understand which
topological properties of power grids and which place-
ments of generators and consumers on the grid are able
to diminish the risk of large-scale outages.
Large-scale outages can often be traced back to the
failure of a single transmission element [2–5]. The initial
failure causes secondary failures, which can eventually
lead to a whole cascade of failures. Cascading failures
have been analyzed in various studies with different mod-
els and from different viewpoints [6–18]. Most of these
previous studies analyze the influence of network topol-
ogy on the cascade of failures using simplified topological
flow models such as the messenger model introduced by
Motter and Lai [6], which is used to study cascading fail-
ures in Refs. [19, 20].
In this work we base the analysis of cascading failures
on the AC power flow equations [21–24]. This allows us to
study the influence of the physical properties of the grid,
such as the placement of generators and consumers and
the power capacitance of the transmission lines, on the
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probability and the extent of cascading failures. To this
end, we consider a random placement of generators and
consumers on a regular 2D grid graph (square grid) as
well as on a model topology for the German high-voltage
transmission grid (380 kV) [25].
An evaluation of the statistics of power failures which
occurred in real power grids in the last decades shows
that the probability of ending up with more than a cer-
tain number of unsupplied consumers often decays like
a power law with the number of unsupplied consumers
Nc [14, 15]. Such a slow decay indicates a significant
probability that a large number of consumers become
unsupplied. It is therefore of practical relevance to un-
derstand which properties of the grid are responsible for
this behavior. In Ref. [14], a simple model has been
suggested to simulate cascading failures that assumes
that the load Fij of a failing transmission line is redis-
tributed in equal parts among the remaining transmission
lines. This model can be solved analytically and yields
a power law distribution when the initial average power
flow through the transmission lines prior to the failure
F = 〈Fij〉 reaches a certain critical ratio of the threshold
power Fth. Below that value, an exponentially fast decay
is found [14].
While most previous studies assume that the power
law dependence is only related to the network topology,
in particular to scale-free topologies [26, 27], the main
goal of this work is to analyze which influence differ-
ent placements of consumers and generators have on the
probability to findNc unsupplied consumers. We start by
finding the stationary power flow in the fully connected
grid. Then we initiate a power line failure by removing
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2one transmission line by hand and find the new station-
ary power flow. The resulting redistribution of the power
flow may trigger further line failures where the trans-
mitted power exceeds a threshold Fth, which we set to
be a certain ratio of the transmission line power capac-
itance. This chain of outages continues until we cannot
find a stable solution for the stationary power flow any-
more. We then record the number of consumers Nc that
cannot be supplied anymore by the available generators.
Note that consumers which are connected within clusters
might also not be supplied if the number of generators
does not at least equal the number of consumers in the
specific cluster. This process is repeated by subsequently
initiating the power outage with every transmission line
of the grid, removing that line and observing the resulting
cascade. Thereby, we obtain the probability distribution
of the blackout size Nc in dependence of the placement
of consumers and generators and the threshold Fth.
We gain further insights by analyzing the share of links
that can induce a cascade of failures depending on the
existence of various fixed cluster sizes. We demonstrate
that the existence of large clusters of generators and con-
sumers makes the grid particularly vulnerable to cascad-
ing failures, since the likelihood for a whole cluster to
break down at once appears to increase with increas-
ing cluster size. We thereby show that the size of the
power outage depends essentially on the placement of
consumers and generators. Finally, we study a real-world
topology, a model for the German high-voltage transmis-
sion grid [25]. In this irregular grid structure, we find a
decay of p¯(Nc) for large Nc which depends strongly on
the threshold Fth. For large Fth the decay is clearly expo-
nential. For small Fth the decay is slow and may indicate
a power law decay. Thus, there might be a critical value
of the threshold Fth in the German grid below which the
cumulative probability density becomes critical and de-
cays with a power law.
Power Grid Model.— We approximate the power grid
as a network of N rotating synchronous machines, rep-
resenting generators and motors. Each machine k ∈
{1, . . . , N} is characterized by the net mechanical power
Pmechk , which is positive for a generator and negative for a
consumer. The state of machine k is given by the angular
frequency and the rotor angle (power angle) θk(t) which
is measured relatively to a reference machine rotating at
the nominal grid angular frequency ω0 = 2pi × 50 Hz.
Correspondingly, ωk(t) = dθk(t)/ dt = θ˙k gives the angu-
lar frequency deviation from the reference frequency ω0.
The dynamics of the rotors are governed by the swing
equation [21–23],
Ik
d2θk
dt2
+Dk
dθk
dt
= Pmechk − P elk , (1)
where P elk is the net electrical power transmitted from ad-
jacent rotating machines through the transmission lines.
Ik is the moment of inertia of the rotor times ω0 and Dk
measures the damping, which is mainly due to damper
windings [28].
For simplicity we neglect ohmic losses of transmission
lines which can be considered small in high voltage lev-
els [29]. Thus, the line admittance is purely inductive,
Yk` = 1/(iωLk`), where Lk` is the inductance of the line
(k, `). Then, the magnitude of the voltage is constant
throughout the grid, |Uk| = U0∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For a
common two-pole synchronous machine, the phase of the
voltage equals the mechanical phase of the rotor. The
expression for the active electric power then simplifies to
P elk =
N∑
`=1
U20
ωLk`
sin(θk − θ`) . (2)
Substituting this result into the swing equation (1) yields
the equations of motion,
Ik
d2θk
dt2
+Dk
dθk
dt
= Pmechk −
N∑
`=1
U20
ωLk`
sin(θk−θ`) . (3)
Using the abbreviations
Pk =
Pmechk −Dkω0
Ik
, αk =
Dk
Ik
,
Kk` =
U20
IkωLk`
,
the oscillator model reads
d2θk
dt2
= Pk − αk dθk
dt
+
N∑
`=1
Kk` sin(θ` − θk) . (4)
These equations of motion are widely used to model
power grids in power engineering, where it goes by the
name synchronous motor model [30]. Notably, this model
is similar to the Kuramoto model, which is studied ex-
tensively in statistical physics [31–33]. In the Kuramoto
model, the inertia term is absent, so it can be seen as the
over-damped limiting case.
In order to find the stationary solutions of the oscil-
lator model (4), it is equivalent to solve the static flow
equations,
0 = Pk +
N∑
`=1
Kk` sin(θ` − θk) . (5)
This can be done by a standard root-finding algorithm
[34]. Note that regular square grids consisting of loops
with four edges, which are studied in the following, may
have multiple stationary (stable and unstable) solutions
[35]. We ensure the stability of a stationary state by
checking that the Jacobian matrix has no positive eigen-
values.
Cascading Failure Algorithm.— In the following we de-
scribe the cascading failure algorithm used in this study.
We determine the stable state with power flows Fij . Note
that we skip realizations for which no stable state exists
or the initial maximal power flow max(Fij) is already
3Fij [s-2]
0
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Example for a cascading failure in a
6 × 6 square grid with open boundary conditions. Triangles
denote generators, disks denote consumers. Intact transmis-
sion lines are indicated by a thin dashed line. The stable state
power flow is plotted in color scale ranging from 0 to 5 s−2.
(a) Power flow in the fully connected grid. (b) Power flow af-
ter removing one line. (c) Power flow after removing all lines
with a power flow larger than the power threshold Fth after
initial removal of a transmission line. (d) After several more
steps (not shown) some nodes become isolated (indicated by
crosses), so the simulation is stopped.
larger than the threshold power flow Fth. Thereby it is
ensured that the initial power flow through all lines is
stable. Next, we remove one of the transmission lines
of the network in order to induce a cascade of failures.
It is again ensured that the network reaches a new sta-
ble state with a new power flow distribution F ′ij . All
transmission lines for which the transferred power F ′ij
exceeds Fth are removed from the grid, and the power
flows are recalculated. This process is repeated until no
transferred power exceeds Fth or until the grid splits into
different subgrids. In the latter case we record the num-
ber of affected consumers, the blackout size Nc, which
is the number of consumers that cannot be supplied by
generators anymore. The whole process is repeated for
each transmission line of the original grid being initially
removed, and also for other placements of generators and
consumers Pk. Fig. 1 illustrates the cascading failure al-
gorithm for the example of a 6×6 square grid. Panel (a)
illustrates the initial stable state before the initial line
removed, panel (b) the stable state after the removal of
one transmission line (upper left side of the grid), panel
(c) the second step of the cascade of failures and panel
(d) the final step with seven disconnected consumers.
Statistical Analysis.— We initiate a cascade of fail-
ures by manually removing each of the NL transmission
lines of the original grid separately. For a L × L square
grid graph with open boundary conditions, there exist
NL = 2L(L− 1) links, so we perform the cascading fail-
ure algorithm NL times. We repeat this for R = 1000
realizations of random placements of generators and con-
sumers Pk. For each realization r, we obtain the his-
togram Er(Nc) which counts the number of events that
Nc consumers are unsupplied. From this, we obtain the
normalized probability distribution function (pdf)
er(Nc) =
Er(Nc)
NL
, (6)
the share of initially removed transmission lines for which
the cascade resulted in Nc isolated consumers.
Then, we compute the complementary cumulative dis-
tribution function (ccdf) pr(Nc) (in short cumulative
probability in the following), yielding the probability that
the number of unsupplied consumers (the blackout size)
is larger than Nc,
pr(Nc) =
∞∑
N ′c=Nc+1
er(N
′
c) . (7)
Finally, we obtain the ensemble average p¯(Nc) over R =
1000 realizations,
p¯(Nc) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
pr(Nc) . (8)
Regular square grid topology with random placement
of consumers.— In the following we present the results
for the statistics of the number of unsupplied consumers
for a L × L square grid with open boundary conditions
for different linear system sizes L. We consider a simple
regular square grid topology with open boundary con-
ditions this rather simple model to systematically study
the influence of different consumer placements. Half of
the nodes serve as consumers and the other half as gen-
erators. Each node k generates the net power Pk = ±P
(positive for generators, negative for consumers), with
P = 1 s−2. The power capacity of all transmission lines
is set to Kij = K = 5 s
−2. All machines have the same
damping parameter αk = α = 1 s
−1.
In order to precisely control the amount of random-
ness in the system, we use the following procedure to
generate a random array Pk [39, 40]: We start from a pe-
riodic arrangement of generators and consumers [41] and
divide the graph into two subgraphs, one carrying all
N/2 generators and the other all N/2 consumers. Then,
p different nodes are chosen randomly from each sub-
graph, forming p generator-consumer pairs. Finally, each
of these generator-consumer pairs is swapped. By gener-
ating a permutation of the periodic arrangement in this
way, it is ensured that no node is swapped twice. The
maximally disordered state is reached after pmax = N/4
swaps, which is the case used throughout this study.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Average cumulative probability p¯(Nc)
(cf. Eq. (8)) for square grids of different linear system size L
and threshold fth = Fth/K: (a) fth = 0.25, (b) fth = 0.3, (c)
fth = 0.4, (d) fth = 0.5. Error bars show the standard error
(cf. Eq. (8)).
There is a finite number of possible realizations, given
by the ensemble size
NE =
(
N/2
p
)
. (9)
In this study we always consider only a small subset of
possible realizations, as NE is a very large number al-
ready for the smallest considered systems.
The cumulative probability p¯(Nc) is illustrated in
Fig. 2 for various power flow thresholds fth = Fth/K
and linear system sizes L. For all considered threshold
values fth, the length of the tail of the cumulative prob-
ability p¯(Nc) is increasing with increasing linear system
size L. Larger systems possess more consumers, so that
the probability to obtain a large number of unsupplied
consumers is increasing and the values of p¯(Nc) are in-
creasing with system size in the tail of the distribution.
The value p¯(0) marks the probability that a cascade
results in one or more unsupplied consumers. This prob-
ability is increasing for decreasing system size and de-
creases with the threshold value fth. This is clearly
seen for low critical values of fth = 0.25 and fth = 0.3
in Fig. 2(a) and (b), respectively. For fth = 0.4 and
fth = 0.5, illustrated in Fig. 2(c) and (d), these trends
are less clearly visible since there are fewer observations
available. Consequently, the relative standard deviation
between different realizations is also increasing with in-
creasing threshold values.
The results for the cumulative probabilities p¯(Nc) in
dependence of the threshold power flow fth for fixed sys-
tem size are illustrated in Fig. 3. We observe an increase
of p¯(Nc) with decreasing fth. The length of the tails are
almost independent of the threshold value fth, indicating
that even for the largest threshold value fth = 0.5 out-
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Average cumulative probability p¯(Nc)
(8) for square grids with varying thresholds fth and fixed lin-
ear system size L (colored lines, red axis). The distribution of
clusters of consumers p¯(Ng) is shown as the black line (black
axis). (a) L = 10, (b) L = 14. Error bars show the standard
error (cf. Eq. (8)).
ages with a large number of unsupplied consumers occur.
For comparison, we also identify the initially existing
consumer clusters that exist prior to the initialization of
the cascade of failures. The size of an initially present
consumer cluster is denoted by Ng. The correspond-
ing complementary cumulative probability distribution
p¯(Ng) (cf. Eqs. (6)-(8)) represents the probability that
the initial consumer clusters are larger than Ng, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 3 (black curves). Interestingly, we do
not find a direct relation between the consumer cluster
size of the original grid Ng and the number of unsupplied
consumers Nc after the cascade. The largest initial con-
sumer clusters Ng are considerably larger than the largest
number of unsupplied consumers after the cascade. For
example, for the considered realizations with L = 10, the
largest initial consumer cluster consists of 42 consumers,
whereas the largest number of unsupplied consumers af-
ter the cascade is 26. We conjecture that in case of the
square grid topology, the distribution of originally exist-
ing consumer clusters Ng provides an upper limit for the
distribution of unsupplied consumers Nc, but we find no
direct relation between Ng and Nc if the consumers are
randomly distributed.
Scaling Analysis.— It has been noted in Ref. [14] that
cascading failures may show evidence for self-organized
criticality (SOC) [42]. SOC has been first found experi-
mentally in rice piles, where the distribution of the size
of avalanches has been found to follow a power law [43].
Numerical studies of avalanches in sand pile models have
shown evidence for power law behavior as well, but the
accuracy of the numerical determination of the avalanche
exponents q is limited by finite-size effects, resulting in
values of the order of q = 1.6 [42, 44, 45]. The most effec-
tive way to evaluate the numerical data is by conducting
a finite-size scaling analysis. Here we apply this strat-
egy to evaluate our numerical data on cascading failures,
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Scaling law for d = 0.8 and q = 1.6.
Average cumulative probability p¯(Nc, L) (8) for square grids
of different linear system size L and with different threshold
power flow fth: (a) fth = 0.25, (b) fth = 0.3, (c) fth = 0.35,
(d) fth = 0.4. Error bars show the standard error (cf. Eq. (8)).
using the scaling ansatz
p¯(Nc, L) = N
−q
c f(Nc/L
d) , (10)
with some unknown scaling function f(Nc/L
d) and the
effective scaling dimension d.
We rescale our data according to the scaling ansatz
(10) with parameters d = 0.8 and q = 1.6 illustrated in
Fig. 4. For the scaling ansatz to be valid, the curves of
all system sizes L should coincide. The agreement of the
data with the scaling ansatz is best for small threshold
values fth. We cannot exclude that the worse agreement
for larger fth is only due to the decreasing statistics, since
less cascades are initiated. Note that the effective scaling
dimension d = 0.8 is smaller than the spatial dimension.
We find good agreement with the scaling ansatz for values
in the range q = 1.6 ± 0.2. For large fth we still find
the best agreement with the scaling ansatz for the same
parameter values as for fth = 0.25. We thus find evidence
for scaling of the average cumulative probability p¯(Nc, L)
with an exponent q ≈ 1.6± 0.2, which possibly does not
depend on the threshold value. A power law dependence
corresponds to a horizontal line of Nqc p¯ (Nc, L) in Fig. 4.
We only find a power law dependence for a small interval.
In contrast to the simple model of Ref. [14] where the
load Fij of a failing transmission line is redistributed in
equal parts among the remaining transmission lines, we
do not find evidence for a critical ratio of the threshold
power Fth within the studied range of Fth values. Inter-
estingly, by including the physical flow model (5) in the
simulation, although we only find a small interval with
a pure power law decay, the exponent q ≈ 1.6 ± 0.2 is
comparable to the one found in Ref. [14], q ≈ 1.4.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) (a) Blue: Maximal number of unsup-
plied consumers Nc that occurs for all possible initial line fail-
ures as function of cluster size Ng. Red: Most likely number
of unsupplied consumers. (b) Blue: Number of supercritical
links whose initial failure causes the maximal possible num-
ber of unsupplied consumers. Red: Number of critical links
whose initial failure cause a power outage.
Impact of clustering in the regular square grid
topology.— To better understand the impact of the initial
clustering of generators and consumers on the cascading
failures, we analyze regular square grids (L = 12) with
open boundary conditions and a periodic arrangement of
generator and consumer clusters of fixed size (1x2, 2x2,
2x4, etc.). These may occur as particular cases of the
random realizations, analyzed before. For these we are
able to demonstrate a direct relation between the initial
consumer cluster size Ng and the number of unsupplied
consumers Nc after the cascade. Obviously, the largest
possible clusters exist if all N/2 consumers are located
on one side of the grid, and all N/2 generators on the
other side (6x12 clusters). The smallest possible clusters
are formed by pairs of connected consumers or genera-
tors (1x2 clusters). We also consider clusters with four
(2x2), eight (2x4), twelve (3x4), 24 (4x6) and 36 (6x6)
consumers or generators per cluster. In order to obtain
comparable results we determine the maximal power flow
in the initial grid Fmax and set the threshold power flow
to Fth = Fmax + 0.1 s
−2.
We measure two quantities and study their dependence
on the cluster size Ng: The maximal number of unsup-
plied consumers that can occur, and the most likely num-
ber of unsupplied consumers Nc (cf. Fig. 5). The results
demonstrate that the most likely value ofNc increases lin-
early with the cluster size Ng (cf. Fig. 5(a), red curve). It
is therefore the most probable event that exactly one con-
sumer cluster disconnects from the grid. For small cluster
sizes, the maximum outage that can occur (cf. Fig. 5(a),
blue curve) is slightly above the most probable outage,
indicating that sometimes more than one cluster contains
unsupplied consumers at the end of the cascade. For large
cluster sizes (24..72 nodes), an outage of one cluster is at
60.0
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Example for a cascade of line failures in the German grid model, with transmission capacity K = 10 s−2
and threshold fth = 0.35. Triangles denote generators, disks denote consumers. (a) Initial power flow. (b) The cascade is
initiated by removing the link marked with a red circle. (c) Another link fails. (d) Another four links fail, and the simulation
is stopped because the grid is not fully connected anymore. We mark the disconnected component containing the unsupplied
nodes and other failed lines in red color.
the same time the maximally possible event and also the
most probable one.
The number of critical links, i.e., those links that cause
a power outage, is found to increase with the initial clus-
ter size Ng up to a cluster size of eight (cf. Fig. 5(b),
red curve). For larger cluster sizes this number of critical
links is decreasing. Links that connect different clusters
are found to be particularly vulnerable. The number of
such links is decreasing with increasing cluster size, ex-
plaining the decrease in the number of critical links.
Next, we consider those links that cause the maximal
observed outage, which we call supercritical links. The
number of such supercritical links is first decreasing with
cluster size and than increasing again (cf. Fig. 5(b), blue
curve), until the number of supercritical links eventually
matches the number of critical links in the limit of large
cluster size. Only a few links cause a maximum outage for
intermediate cluster sizes, whereas for large cluster sizes
almost every link causes a maximal outage. We conclude
that large clusters are favorable in the sense that only
few transmission lines can cause an outage. On the other
hand, if such an outage occurs, the impact is much more
severe, i.e., more consumers are affected.
German Transmission Grid.— So far, all results have
been obtained for the regular square grid topology. To
test our findings on a realistic grid topology, we con-
sider a model for the German high-voltage transmission
grid. The model grid is based on data from the SciGRID
project [25], where only the 380 kV level is considered.
The objective is to test our algorithm on a more real-
istic, non-regular topology, for which it is sufficient to
consider the topology of the German grid, isolated from
the rest of the pan-European electricity network. As be-
fore, we consider a binary distribution of generators and
consumers and a constant line power transmission ca-
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Average cumulative probability p¯(Nc)
(8) as function of the number of unsupplied consumers Nc
for the German grid model for various threshold values fth
(colored lines, red axis). The distribution of initial consumer
clusters p¯(Ng) is shown as the black line (black axis). Error
bars show the standard error (cf. Eq. (8)).
pacity. We also apply the cascading failure algorithm de-
scribed above and consider R = 1000 realizations. Fig. 6
demonstrates a cascade of single line failures in the Ger-
man grid model for a binary distribution of generators
and consumers. Here, we use the parameters P = 1 s−2,
K = 10 s−2, α = 1 s−1, and fth = 0.35.
We analyze cascading failures for various threshold val-
ues fth. The results for the cumulative probabilities
p¯(Nc) are shown in Fig. 7. With decreasing fth, the
values of the average cumulative probability p¯(Nc) are
7increasing. This behavior is similar to that of the square
grids (cf. Fig. 2). Note that the German grid model con-
tains 254 nodes and 317 links, so that its size is compara-
ble to a 12×12 square grid, which has 264 links, so we can
compare the results with the corresponding probability
density p¯(Nc) shown in Fig. 2. We observe clear differ-
ences: First, for the German grid p¯(Nc) does not decay
continuously but shows abrupt steps. Second, the decay
of p¯(Nc) for large Nc depends strongly on the threshold
fth. For large fth the decay is clearly exponential. For
fth = 0.4 the decay is slow and may indicate a power law
decay, although the statistics does not allow to extract
a definite power exponent. There might be a critical
value of the threshold fth below which the cumulative
probability density becomes critical and decays with a
power law. Thus, we may conclude that the difference
in the topological structure of the German high-voltage
grid as compared to the square grids leads to marked
differences in the probability of cascading failures, whose
origin needs to be studied in more detail. We also show in
Fig. 2 the distribution of consumer clusters p¯(Ng) (black
line) existing in the grid before the cascade. We observe
that for the smallest threshold value, fth = 0.4, the tail
of the cumulative probability distribution of unsupplied
consumers Nc is similar to the tail of the distribution of
clusters, indicating that the probability of large outage
sizes is closely related to the occurrence of large clusters
in the German grid topology.
Conclusions and Outlook.— Single line failures can in-
duce a cascade of failures leading to power outages for a
potentially large number of consumers. Although cascad-
ing failures have been studied before, most of the studies
were based on simple flow models. In this article we con-
tribute to a more realistic model for cascading failures
based on a AC load flow model. We developed an algo-
rithm for cascading failures which is widely applicable to
different network topologies and parameter ranges.
First, we analyzed regular square grids with a random
placement of generators and consumers. We considered
different threshold values for the transmitted power Fth.
We identified a scaling law with a power law exponent for
the probability to obtain a minimum number of unsup-
plied consumers (blackout size) in dependence of the sys-
tem size. In contrast to the simplified model of Ref. [14],
we do not find evidence for a critical ratio of the thresh-
old power Fth but rather find the same dependence in a
wide range of threshold values fth. Moreover, we find a
power law decay with power q = 1.6± 0.2 which is com-
parable to the one found in Ref. [14], q ≈ 1.4. We do not
find a direct relation between the distribution of initial
clusters and the resulting blackout sizes after the cascad-
ing failures. Often, clusters of consumers are found to
split into multiple parts during a cascade of line failures,
which might explain why the observed blackout size is
often smaller than the initial cluster size.
Second, we studied regular square grids with a peri-
odic arrangement of consumer clusters of fixed size. We
demonstrated that large consumer clusters often lead to
large outages, whereas small clusters typically lead to
only small outages for the initial failure of a single line.
In contrast, the number of critical links, i.e., links which
cause a cascade if they fail, is decreasing with increasing
cluster size. Here, we can also identify a direct relation
between consumer cluster sizes and the number of un-
supplied consumers after a cascade has been initiated.
Finally, we studied a real-world topology, a model for
the German high-voltage transmission grid. In this irreg-
ular grid structure, we find a qualitatively similar behav-
ior for the complementary cumulative probability p¯(Nc)
that a blackout of a certain minimum size occurs, but
we also observe clear differences: First, for the German
grid, p¯(Nc) does not decay continuously but shows abrupt
steps, which could be only due to the small number of
observations. Second, the decay of p¯(Nc) for large Nc
depends strongly on the threshold fth. For large fth the
decay is clearly exponential. For fth = 0.4 the decay is
slow and may indicate a power law decay, although the
statistics does not allow to extract a definite power expo-
nent. There might be a critical value of the threshold fth
below which the cumulative probability density becomes
critical and decays with a power law.
Thus, we may conclude that the difference in the topo-
logical structure of the German high-voltage grid as com-
pared to the square grids leads to marked differences in
the probability of cascading failures. Its origin and de-
pendence on various topological measures will have to be
studied in more detail in future research. It remains to
find criteria for the question which arrangements of gen-
erators and consumers are beneficial for a particular grid
topology in order to minimize the chance and extent of
blackouts. In future research we will also study the in-
fluence of heterogeneous transmission line capacities and
more realistic distributions for the consumed and gener-
ated power at each node.
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